Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the ushering in of a period of victory for western capitalism as the dominant politico-economic formation, Globalisation has become a term ever more prevalent in trend-observational discourse. It is an economic phenomenon which could be said to erode national borders and slowly eat away at the traditional concept of the sovereign state. As such, Globalisation has facilitated the booming cross-border exchange of goods, services, capital and labour; in the spheres of culture, technology and economics . This acceleration of exchange entails a perceivable erosion of the economic sovereignty bequeathed to states, and deriving from the sovereign state under international public and economic law.
Such erosion of sovereignty occurs due to the necessity of states to adopt a neo-liberal economic platform in order to facilitate the international integration of markets. This demands among other things the unrestricted international flow of capital, low transactional taxation and the opening of domestic markets to international competition; anathema to the 20th Century Keynesian social-democratic economic model in the capitalist ‘first’ world, which placed internal economic development and employment at the heart of the agenda . The Keynesian model sought to do away with the combustible international market of the period of Empire, up to the end of the long 19th Century, which ended in the great depression. This international imperial model being not dissimilar to today’s globalised economy, given that the technological advancements for the free flow of goods in the subsequent period have been merely incremental .
This phenomenon of Globalisation, and its rebirth, can be analysed in the context of the nascent state of Kosovo, which has been incubated as an independent state in parallel to the forwards march of a globalised world economy. Kosovo’s unique history is termed within the context of Yugoslavia, its rise and relative success and ultimately its demise. The Yugoslav economic model, of worker self-management, provided each factory, company or co-operative with the autonomous and collective right to production and sale, creating a semi-marketised structure and a highly regionally internationalised economic structure which should have set the former constituent nations and territories in good stead for the post-cold war period through the creation of neo-corporatism . It is also fundamental in understanding the post-independence economic relations of Kosovo.
Fundamental questions can be posed concerning the nature of the economic sovereignty of Kosovo in a globalised and regionalised context; with a broad international institutional consensus on the benefits of open, globalised, markets and the EU on Kosovo’s doorstep, with Kosovo even using the Euro and being a member of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Such questions are imperative in the context of Kosovo, with this young state trying to assert its sovereignty in all manners, whether territorially or from international institutions. Therefore it is necessary to consider the vital, and largely ignored question of; whether, and to what extent, the paradigm of Globalisation and this international integration of markets undermines the economic sovereignty of Kosovo.
This should be achieved by considering in turn the definition of economic sovereignty in both public and economic law, before turning the question towards what is truly meant by Globalisation and lastly considering the case of Kosovo, through a polity consideration of Kosovo’s position vis-à-vis relevant economic integration processes and the objective analysis of relevant case-studies in order to establish lessons learned, and therefore arriving at the crux of the matter.
Economic Sovereignty in International Public Law
In international public law, the principle of the sovereign state is well grounded. Ever since its assertion through the peace of Westphalia, it has been a key principle in the international relations of states. As Hume asserts in his Treatise, long-term cooperation can derive inter-personnel advantages, wherein derives convention and ultimately the state, government arises through the military need to control the state and law derives from the need to formalise the advantage of conventions; these apparatus form the necessary infrastructure to rule inter-state disputes, and so ultimately the international principle of sovereignty . In the modern era, this principle is codified in article 2, paragraph 1 of the UN charter: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” . Whilst Kosovo is not yet a member of the UN, it is equally bound to this principle by the provision of paragraph 6 of this same article and Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Kosovo: “Ratified international agreements and legally binding norms of international law have superiority over the laws of the Republic of Kosovo ”whereby Kosovo undertakes an obligation towards the observation of international law. This therefore asserts that Kosovo is entitled to assert it’s sovereign status as codified by the UN charter, when taken in conjunction with the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the status of Kosovo, which rules its independence as legally valid according to international law, although sui generis, which means that it cannot be used as precedent due to the specific and unique circumstances of Kosovo’s independence .
One part of this sovereign status is determined under international convention as being the economic sovereignty of a given country, or put differently, that country’s legal supremacy over its domestic economic and monetary affairs. This jurisprudence of international law was formed during the ‘Serbian Loans Case’ of 1929 which was heard at the then functional Permanent Court for International Justice(PCIJ), and the subsequent Brazilian Loans case of 1930 involving the same affair . These cases involved a bi-lateral dispute between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Republic of France, and the Republic of Brazil and the Republic of France concerning a currency revaluation, away from the gold-standard, on the part of the Republic of France. The question of whether the repayments where due in the currency of the loan, the franc, or it’s agreed equivalent in gold value as both were tied during the formation of the contracts to gold; this was the lesser and initial value of the loan. The PCIJ ruled that, in a move accepted by all parties and since internationally, that the right held over internal fiscal policy is inalienably the sovereign states and not subject to outside influence , nevertheless a ‘gold clause’ is superior to a monetary policy and therefore binding in international contractual arrangements (although this part is effectively null and void in the modern world).
The principle of the inalienable right to economic sovereignty on the part of the sovereign state is therefore clearly established in international public law through the conjunction of the UN Charter article 2, and the jurisprudence of the ‘Serbian Loans case’. This implies that no external international actor, whether it be a state or an organisation, has the right to forcefully impose its economic will upon a sovereign state. Nevertheless a sovereign state, through its internal monopoly upon economic decisions, has the right to cede certain elements of its economic sovereignty towards international actors. For example the necessary ceding of economic sovereignty on border tariffs as a precondition for joining the European Economic Area (EEA) , this is because joining such an economic community requires the consent of other members, who set out requisite economic pre-conditions in exchange for becoming member of the community. This voluntarily ceding of economic sovereignty is indeed necessary for the correct functioning of the integrated economic community without the interplay of regional politics. This avoids the kind of political problems which have besmirched Kosovo’s membership of the smaller and looser economic CEFTA agreement, which shall be later explained in detail.
Economic Sovereignty and International Economic Law
International Economic Law is distinguishable to Public law in that it concerns itself with economic inter-institutional interaction on an international scale rather than with the rules of international relations. Under International Economic Law, economic sovereignty is also a clearly established principle for trade relations. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted under UN General Assembly resolution 3281 on the 12th December 1974 asserts in Chapter 2, Article 1 the supreme right of sovereign states to decide their own internal economic system:
“Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever”
This asserts therefore the principle of economic sovereignty as supreme within international Economic Law, as codified by the preamble of the Charter in conjunction with this article. It can therefore be considered that any sovereign state which chooses to reject or withdraw from the Globalisation/neo-liberalism paradigm has the lawful right to do so, asserting their position as an economic ‘free agent’. Nevertheless, they retain the international legal obligation to honour existing codified and formed contracts which have been signed between states or state dependent enterprises where no contractual abrogation clause exists . An example of such inter-state contracts would be gas or electricity supply agreements.
Furthermore, a ‘new’ economic sovereignty is discernible, whereby an element of economic sovereignty is handed over to international or regional trade institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or in Kosovo’s case the loose CEFTA agreement, albeit with the active consent of the sovereign state, or again in Kosovo’s case through the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) representation due to regional political dissension on participation, as Kosovo was a pre-independence state upon joining CEFTA, and the situation of representation has not successfully been resolved with Bosnia and Serbia. This ‘borrowed’ sovereignty is used in order to police the arrangement. This can be beneficial for small states, such as Kosovo, as the ‘equality of sovereignty’ can be better protected between large and small actors in the context of multi-lateral institutionalised trade relationships, as resolution mechanisms are institutionalised when compared to bi-lateral ‘bullying’ relationships. Furthermore, it helps avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ between sovereign states in terms of capital controls in order to compete for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as tariff levels are normally locked in as the same or similar between each participant country and strictly regulated. Therefore institutionalised economic sovereignty can help maintain a stable international economic system , an element towards system stability which happened to be entirely absent during the volatile 19th Century phase of imperial Globalisation.
Economic Sovereignty and Globalisation: Hand in Hand or Head to Head?
In order to consider whether Globalisation is necessarily incompatible or rather a symbiotic phenomenon with economic sovereignty, it is relevant to firstly consider the nature, characteristics and development of Globalisation. Globalisation is generally considered to be the increase in the international integration of the markets for goods, services, capital and labour; having cultural, technological, geopolitical and economic implications . We are primarily concerned with the geopolitical and geo-economic implications of Globalisation.
This replacement of domestic markets with regionally and internationally integrated markets leads to the necessity for hegemonic markets with uniform, or near uniform, trade regulations and barriers. A striking example of this is the example of the ever strengthening regional economic integration in Europe, with the growth of the EEA and the heightening in importance of the European Union (EU) . This integration has seen the replacement of unilateral economic actions and decisions with plurilateral equivalents which has entailed a loss of independence of individual economic actors (and so a de-facto loss of economic sovereignty) to a supra-national actor in order to assure market concurrence and congruence within the neo-liberal paradigm. Nevertheless, within EU law the transfer of powers is “limited, conditional, dependent and reversible” and so sovereignty is rather ‘borrowed’ than ‘lost’ by member states, this is asserted through Article 50 of the ‘Treaty for the European Union’ section of the Lisbon Treaty, 2007, which defines the conditions for state withdrawal from the EU .
We can therefore ask ourselves what the overarching effect of Globalisation is upon economic sovereignty. This appears to be simple, Globalisation has on differing levels eroded the capacity of individual sovereign states to determine their own economic system, more-so on a regional basis then an international one through participation in regional trade organisations. Nevertheless, to what extent can this be said to be irrefutable and inevitable?
As previously iterated, Globalisation is not a new idea but ultimately a rebirth of the late 19th century’s economic model . This means that there is a historical background to evaluate the effects of the international integration of markets, with acceptably similar parameters to consider it still relevant; instant communication through telegram, similar speed cargo shipments, absence of border tariffs through empire etc. This system was ultimately rejected by the world powers of the time in favour of the Keynesian social-democratic model, as this first Globalisation was ultimately considered to create undesirably distorting effects and to subject the then weak states to the whims of world trade. Such is the implication that the present 2nd Globalisation will also fail due to this irreconcilable damage inflicted upon weak states which desire to recoup their economic sovereignty. This historical analysis firmly places the ideas of economic sovereignty and Globalisation as diametric and so ‘head to head’, rather than ‘hand in hand’. Of course, there are other non-economic aspects to Globalisation which buck this trend, notably accelerated cultural exchange which happened during the demise of the colonial model with large migrations of people. A phenomenon which interestingly also happened in the non-capitalist ‘second world’ of the communist-bloc and the non-aligned group; such as internal displacement of populations within the USSR or even Czechoslovak-Vietnamese worker migrations.
Nevertheless, the ‘head to head’ conclusion is an analysis grounded in historical facts and the historical context of a bankrupt post-war world in the midst of decolonisation, current economic shocks have been grave but ultimately incomparable to this particular international metamorphosis. Instead in the current climate, of post-communist transition and neo-liberal economic hegemony, we can perceive the increased embrace by economically sovereign actors of a purposefully neo-liberal economic approach. Or as described by economic journalist Thomas Freidman as sovereign states donning the ‘golden straitjacket’ of low tariffs, low taxation and integration into supra-national economic free trade structures such as the EU, in the pursuit of foreign direct investment (FDI) which can most effectively reform industry and augment internal investment.
This has been the modus-operandi of nearly all economically transitional states, with the ultimate (and potentially unfulfilled) promise of competitiveness and ultimately prosperity. It is unclear nonetheless whether this is a choice of planned economic strategy or an example of ‘the only game in town’ for such sovereign states. In any case, integration into supra-national organisations is very often beneficial for transitional states as this infers an obligation to aid economic reform towards competitiveness in order to avoid long term damage to the aforementioned supra national organisation. EU structural funds are a good example of this aid process afforded to transitional states within the integration process of these trade organisations . Within the European post-communist transitional context also, the CEFTA agreement has been a trade organisation beneficial towards the EU/EEA integration process, being a club of ‘EU perspective’ nations, initially the Baltic and Visegrad countries and Slovenia and latterly the South Eastern European zone, which take it upon themselves to trade freely to reduce future market shocks which will arise from joining the common market. It therefore goes to show, this is an example of Globalisation as a consequence of economic sovereignty rather than as a cause of its erosion, succinctly demonstrating a symbiotic ‘hand in hand’ interpretation of integrationist Globalisation in the contemporary sense, rather than a combative ‘head to head’ nature between these two directional economic forces.
It is therefore clear that whilst Globalisation and economic sovereignty can be diametrically opposed, with Globalisation suppressing and devouring the rights of economically sovereign states as was the case in the late 19th Century, it can also occur with the explicit permission of such sovereign states. These sovereign states therefore actively, and for the most part willingly, reform towards the homogeneous neo-liberal market necessary to facilitate a globalised economy; as has been evident in the late 20th Century/early 21st Century second wave of Globalisation. This is normally done in promise of the greater benefits promised by this ‘golden straitjacket’ of economic policies and integration and demonstrates that these two factors of economic sovereignty and Globalisation have recently progressed ‘hand in hand’ as necessary bedfellows. The Central, South-Eastern and Eastern European experience of CEFTA being a prescient example.
Economic Sovereignty in the context of post-independence Kosovo: an effective development tool?
Attention will now be turned to the topic of economic sovereignty in Kosovo vis-à-vis Globalisation; a concern which is, to the best of my knowledge, previously uncovered within the context of academic literature or institutional reportage. This piece of original research will therefore be undertaken within the context of an analytical consideration of the policy and polity position of Kosovo with relation to the strength and enactment of economic sovereignty on a governmental level, and a comparison with relevant case studies of the experiences of newly independent and newly sovereign states in order to extract a consideration of the position which Kosovo, and it’s economic sovereignty, finds itself in. To reach this purpose, the case studies to be used are all European states; the post-colonial state of Ireland, which shall be nuanced by the case of post-independence Latvia. The Bosnian example shall also be drawn heavily upon.
Kosovo’s status quo:
In terms of economic statistics, Kosovo finds itself in an underwhelming position. The CIA World Factbook reports Kosovo’s estimated GDP (At Purchasing Power Parity) to be $14.11 Billion, of which 15% is thought to be remittances from the large diaspora, and 10% is thought to come from international donor programmes . Furthermore, a striking 45% of the population is considered to be unemployed . This economic malaise, and the perception that it is not improving, is at the root of the current wave of illegal emigration towards the EU, a lack of perceived integration into trade structures and subsequent ‘modernisation’ therefore playing an important role. Kosovo has nevertheless made efforts towards improving the economic situation on an international trade level.
Under the UNMIK, pre-independence, administration accords were signed in order for Kosovo to integrate into the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in 2006; under the current ‘CEFTA 2006’ formation of the trade group . CEFTA, initially devised in 1993, is a regional trade agreement devised initially by the Visegrad Countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), the Baltic Countries (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) and Slovenia in order to economically prepare themselves for their prospective EU integration and the then novel Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) , as was foreseen in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on the European Union, TEU, & Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU) . With EU integration of ex-CEFTA states the membership of this organisation has continued to renew based upon EU prospectives, the current members of CEFTA are; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo. CEFTA, theoretically, is a multi-national reciprocal agreement which removes trade tariff barriers between the participant states; and so enhances and facilitates regional integration by this voluntary restraint of the participants’ right to impose trade barriers through the enactment of their economic sovereignty. Indeed, CEFTA recognises this economic sovereignty of states by allowing members to guard tariffs on certain ‘protected’ industries within the context of the agreement . Herein lies the core of CEFTA’s failings.
Kosovo’s CEFTA experience:
The Kosovar experience of CEFTA, in reality, has been ultimately negative despite the positive start. A large part of this is the political fallout from Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Following the independence, a stand-off ensued between the CEFTA members who did not recognise Kosovo’s independence, Bosnia and Serbia, and Kosovo. This stand-off centred around the introduction of new customs stamps for goods which passed through Kosovo; a move which Bosnia and Serbia felt asserted the independence of the state, so recognition of the customs stamp would therefore infer recognition of the state. This lead to a de-facto economic blockade of Kosovar goods by two CEFTA members, undermining the agreements credibility . Whilst UNMIK, which continues to represent Kosovo in CEFTA, has always stated that the new Kosovar customs stamps do not assert territorial independence (no “Republic of Kosovo” insignia appearing) , the dispute itself was only resolved in 2011 when these two parties finally accepted the fact in order to facilitate EU dialogue . Even if the situation concerning free trade between these countries is seemingly resolved, it has nonetheless left scarring consequences for Kosovo; with the dwindling of FDI inflows into Kosovo since the independence period and this blockade, seemingly due to a loss of confidence of investors in the political stability of the situation on the ground .
Another failing of the CEFTA agreement from the Kosovar perspective is the right to implement tariffs to other member states in protected industries. Kosovo has not done so, preferring the absence of any tariffs with other CEFTA members , even Bosnia and Serbia, and has ultimately lost out because of this. The key reason for this is the fact that Kosovo holds a comparative economic advantage in agriculture when compared to other CEFTA members , due to a depressed wage pool and relatively high quality and diversity level due to the agrarian culture. This makes Kosovo analogous to the Irish immediate post-colonial situation, where it was termed as “British pool for cheap labour’, and surviving in the short term by exporting agricultural products to Britain . This could not suffice for Ireland in the long-term, who aggressively chased FDI in industrial development from the introduction of the 1958 Finance Act featuring ‘export profits tax relief’ to European and American investors, a pre-cursor to non-domestic taxation status . This cannot suffice as a production strategy in the long term for Kosovo either, the introduction of agricultural tariffs by Albania, making Kosovar agricultural products price uncompetitive in Albania, a case to point .
Furthermore, this reliance by Kosovo on agriculture and over-compliance with the extremely trade liberal CEFTA exigencies is economically dangerous to Kosovo on another level. As the CEFTA rules and the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), for EU accession, rules differ on tariff substance, Kosovo is at danger of being in a position whereby it does not comply with the less liberal SAA trade conditions for agriculture, wherein a level of domestic protectionism in agriculture is encouraged for all participants. This experience happened to Latvia, which ultimately damaged their overall competitiveness due to unfavourable conditions for economic reform . This will potentially pose a setback to Kosovo’s joining the SAA, expected to be implemented in 2015 .
Therefore it can be considered that vis-à-vis CEFTA, Kosovo has gained little economic advantage in exchange for undergoing a repression of economic sovereignty in voluntarily adhering to the removal of tariffs without conditions within the framework of this agreement. Instead, it has been economically blockaded by two members for political reasons and undermined by another, fearing damage to a domestic industry. Indeed, when we consider the three members who have not introduced measures against Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Moldova, little export capacity has been developed, particularly with Moldova. Instead bilateral relations with Germany and Turkey have been preferred, regardless of the trade tariffs with Germany, and Turkey being the only non-CEFTA member to have a bi-lateral free trade agreement with Kosovo . In order to render CEFTA membership meaningful, more trade relations should be sought with CEFTA members; particularly Moldova, which faces similar economic and political challenges to Kosovo, along with Bosnia, Macedonia and even Serbia, as these countries along with Kosovo are expected to be long-term members due to political obstacles to EU integration . More should also be done to extend CEFTA’s reach also, to open up new markets for Kosovo; the south Caucasus region, and Georgia in particular, is especially interesting, along with Ukraine, and Kosovo should more actively lobby for their integration into the agreement, or even open bi-lateral free trade negotiations with these states.
Kosovo’s structural challenges to economic autonomy:
Nonetheless for all the failings of CEFTA for Kosovo, a recognition that Kosovo was never likely to become successful within CEFTA in particular, and international trade relations in general, is to my eyes important. The explanation for this ultimately lies in Kosovo’s production output. Kosovo is ultimately an agricultural producer, with a comparative local advantage in this sector for reasons already explained, nonetheless the micro-production levels of production and fractured agricultural market, with 53% of agricultural land being small holdings belonging to independent individuals in 2008 , means that Kosovo cannot become a genuinely competitive European agricultural producer compared to countries such as Poland, whilst retaining a development goal; especially when the fact that Kosovar agricultural production only had a value of 24€ per hectare of arable land in 2007 , by far the lowest in Europe and as such hindering any foreseeable agriculturally driven development perspective; based upon the existing infrastructural arrangement.
This should have been recognised by the then UNMIK leadership, as with the present leadership, that the economic configuration at the time was uncompetitive and needed internal reform before fully opening Kosovo to the international markets, rather than going ahead in joining CEFTA as a prestige agreement for Kosovo, in the hope that the FDI would be attracted by this in order to, in time, render Kosovo’s industries competitive. Regardless of the fact that history shows that uncompetitive European economies, whence opened to international markets, struggle further to attract FDI due to the subsequent difficulty to reform, as the Latvian case shows . Latvia, upon even joining the EU, still had serious problems with the ‘normal’ economic functioning of the state; with for example problems in correct tax collection, high unemployment, and a meagre percentage of the population who were earning the necessary money to economically support themselves . These problems are reminiscent of Kosovo’s situation and provide as a stark example for the very limited reform potential when economic sovereignty, to a supra-national economic organism such as the EU, is restricted. In Latvia’s case, it was indeed shown to impact negligibly upon FDI increases, whilst restraining the necessary economic reforms to strengthen the economic potential of the country . In other words, internal economic sovereignty should have been asserted from the off, to power reform, rather than diluted, in the hope of external help.
In another sense, as was correctly recognised by the agreement to join CEFTA, internal privatisation programs rarely work, rather asset stripping a country by a few well-placed individuals with the influence for the state selling to fall favourably for them. This was the case in Bosnia, were state enterprises where sold on ethnic lines to either former Nomenclature managers, or to individuals able to influence the sales process, creating a group of highly wealthy and powerful individuals which combine business domination and political posts . Creating a de-facto oligarchy. Whilst this consequence of internal privatisation in a post-war context is highly prevalent in Bosnia, it is less-so in Kosovo. This is largely due to the greater openness to international markets in Kosovo, with CEFTA being an example; nevertheless, there is still a strong constituent body of war profiteers in Kosovo, whose influence would only be strengthened by an internally looking development strategy, all but demolishing national economic sovereignty.
Therefore, in order to retain economic sovereignty, an externally focused privatisation programme should be followed at the same time as reforming, or rather re-founding, the basis for industry in Kosovo. This is because Kosovar industry relies overwhelmingly on Heavy Industry, such as mining. Light Industry, such as production and manufacturing is overwhelmingly the industry which attracts FDI in Europe . Due to the fact that in the long run, European Heavy Industry cannot be internationally competitive due to rising wage demands . This Light Industry is currently not particularly present within Kosovo’s economy, and should be encouraged by government initiatives or subsidies within this field. An example of how economic sovereignty can be used in the Kosovo context in order to encourage the global FDI inflows needed to ultimately strengthen and kick start Kosovo’s economic prospective within the globalised economic system.
In conclusion, the successful enactment of economic sovereignty by Kosovo, in the context of Globalisation, remains largely within the possession of Kosovo, though facing serious challenges for a clear and correct development strategy. Whilst I have shown that it can be beneficial to ‘lend’ economic sovereignty to international and regional trade structures such as the EU or CEFTA, in the Kosovar context no gain has yet been made from participation. This is ultimately due to a lack of relevant exportation perspective, using CEFTA instead as an import agreement, combined with political disagreements within the agreement. This lack of exportation perspective is truly at the crux of Kosovo’s economic problems, which will impede the future economic strength of Kosovo to resist infringements upon Kosovo’s economic sovereignty. Indeed, in my mind, a situation of the complete submission of Kosovo’s economic sovereignty to a ‘troika’ of international actors as is presently the case in Greece can be envisaged in the long term if no solution is found to this lack of international economic competitiveness. Nevertheless, in the short term to medium term, Kosovo can enact its economic sovereignty, which is undoubtedly its own, as a free agent; and is free to make and break economic treaties as it wants. This is above all true of the CEFTA agreement, which has ultimately been unsuccessful for Kosovo, who should seek internal reform of the arrangement, to strengthen and broaden its reach and make it a more interesting trade partner.
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